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Bobango: Commercial Law

COMMERCIAL LAW
BUCKHANNON SALES CO. v. APPALANTIC CORP., 338 S.E.2d 222 (W.
Va. 1985).
Civil Procedure-CommercialLaw-Contracts-Evidence
The Circuit Court of Lewis County had sustained appellee's motion in limine
to prevent the introduction of parol testimony to clarify the 1979 contract between
Buckhannon and Appalantic for the purchase of coal. Buckhannon's suit under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act of West Virginia sought clarification of
whether trucking and washing costs of coal sold under the contract must be deducted before taking its commission on all sales, or only for coal taken from
certain specified mines, as Buckhannon maintained. Appalantic's motion was sustained, to exclude parol evidence, and summary judgment was issued for appellee.
The court addressed the following issues: (1) Whether the 1979 contract between the parties was uncertain and ambiguous, so as to make parol evidence
admissible; and (2) whether the circuit court erred in granting a summary judgment
to appellee where issues of fact under the contract remained in dispute.
In reversing and remanding, the court held that the parol evidence rule does
not bar the introduction of testimony when writings are ambiguous. The court
could not find as a matter of law that the agreements between the parties clearly
indicated whether the washing and trucking charges should be deducted from all
coal supplied under the agreement or only a portion of it. When viewed without
reference to extrinsic evidence, the contract was susceptible to different interpretations. It was possible that Buckhannon's testimony would not have varied
or contradicted the writings, but provided completeness. Therefore, sustaining the
motion in limine was improper. Also, because issues of fact were raised, the trial
court's judgment on the pleadings was improper.
CHARLESTON URBAN RENE WAL A UTH. v. STANLEY, 346 S.E.2d 740 (W.
Va. 1985).
Accord and Satisfaction-CommercialLaw-Landlord-Tenant-Property The
Circuit Court of Kanawha County had upheld CURA's eviction of appellee Stanley from Charleston premises which he rented on a month-to-month lease for use
as a parking lot at $600 per month. Upon termination of the tenancy in November,
1982, Stanley held over, tendering $600 in one form or another for each month
held over. His January payment was in four installments of $150 each. CURA's
action for damages was dismissed by the circuit court on the grounds of accord
and satisfaction.
The court addressed two issues in this case: (1) Whether, where a tenant
tenders a check to his landlord bearing a notation that it is offered in full settlement,
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the retention and use of the check by the landlord constitute an accord and
satisfaction; (2) whether an appellant's position that Stanley's continuing occupation of the premises would be construed as a tenancy from day-to-day, at $150
per day, is tenable, in light of CURA's acceptance and retention of checks for
seven months after termination of the lease.
The court, reversing and remanding, found that not only did Stanley's final
check for January, 1983, bear the notation "January rent in full," it was clear
that the check was offered only on condition that it be taken as full payment,
or not at all. These elements, combined with $600 total consideration, satisfied
all the requirements for an accord and satisfaction for appellee's January, 1983
rent. The rent for the period February through July, 1983, was duly paid in
installments of $600 each, but it was unclear if these were also tendered in full
payment, which the circuit court must now decide.
Judge Brotherton, dissenting, stated that there is no magic in the words "in
full." When a check bears some notation that it is offered in full payment of a
claim, the retention and use of it by the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction. CURA's acceptance and useof the February through July checks should
be an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law for those months. The January
check placed CURA on notice of Stanley's intent, as did words such as "February
rent," etc.
FIRST NAT'L BANK IN MARLINTON v. BLACKHURST, 345 S.E.2d 567 (W.
Va. 1986).
Civil Procedure-CommercialLaw-Discovery Requests-Evidence-Personal
Liability on CommercialNotes
The Circuit Court of Pocahontas County denied defendants' motion for a
directed verdict in a suit brought by Marlinton Bank claiming defendants were
personally liable for some $94,000 worth of notes signed by them in order to
finance the operation of Josh, Inc., which had since filed for bankruptcy. After
the jury found defendants jointly and severally liable for the indebtedness, defendants moved for a j.n.o.v., and a new trial, both denied.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed five issues in the
case: (1) Whether, where the defendants' signatures upon a note do not show
their representative capacity, and the plaintiff was an immediate party to the
instrument, parol evidence may be introduced to clarify personal liability; (2)
whether sufficient evidence was introduced to rebut a presumption of a signature's
genuineness, thus making the trial court's refusal of a new trial or j.n.o.v. error;
(3) whether an exchange of notes for new notes which, unknown to the holder,
contain forged signatures, operates as a discharge; (4) whether the court's failure
to supplement discovery requests was prejudicial to the defendants; (5) whether
a new trial should be granted by reason of defense counsel's possible violation
of the West Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility.
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The court held that although defendants signed under the legend "Josh, Inc.,"
the legend alone was not enough to free defendants of personal liability. This
fact, however, combined with the bank being an immediate party to the instrument, meant the admission of parol evidence on the issue of personal liability
was proper. While the presumption of the signature of A. A. Blackhurst being
a genuine one was removed in favor of the bank by the defendant's denial and
production of a sample signature, the jury chose to believe the bank's other
witnesses, and its verdict will not be second guessed. Even if Blackhurst's signature
on subsequent notes was forged, it was still possible to find him liable on three
earlier notes. For this reason also, the failure to supplement discovery of the new
notes was not grounds for a new trial. Attorney Kupec's violation of a disciplinary
rule in his joint representation of defendants was only problematic. Moreover,
the question of a new trial based on strategy of counsel is one of discretion for
the trial court, and in the absence of a clear abuse of such discretion will not
be reversed.
GREGOIRE v. LOWNDES BANK, 342 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1986).
Commercial Law-GuarantyAgreements-Negotidble Instruments
The Circuit Court of Randolph County permanently enjoined appellant Bank
from foreclosing upon real estate owned by appellees as guarantors of two promissory notes executed by separate guaranty agreements in 1976 and 1979 for the
purpose of coal leasing and mining.
The issues were: (1) Whether the trial court erred in deeming the guaranty
agreements negotiable instruments under section 46-3-102(1)(e) of the West Virginia Code and the Uniform Commercial Code; (2) whether there was a breach
of the contract of guaranty by appellant bank which increased the guarantors'
risk or otherwise injured their rights, so as to discharge appellees' obligations.
The court, reversing and remanding, found that the trial court erred in ruling
the guaranty agreements to be negotiable instruments, and misapplied sections
46-3-415, -416, and -606(1) of the West Virginia Code to the transactions in question. The court held that a negotiable instrument must contain an unconstitutional
promise or order to pay, must be for "a sum certain," and be payable on demand
or at a definite time. The agreements here fulfilled none of these conditions, being
continuing guarantees. Appellant's failure to provide any specific extension of
time for payment and its activities with respect to collateral may have been bad
business advice, but does not alone justify discharge of a guarantor. Thus the
judgment of the circuit court must be reversed and remanded for dissolution of
the permanent injunction.
TROYMINING CORP. v. ITMANN COAL CO., 346 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1986).
Commercial Law-Contracts-OralModification-Unconscionability
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The Circuit Court of Wyoming County directed a verdict for the defendant,
Itmann Coal Company, in a suit brought by Troy Mining's predecessor, V & R
Coal Company, on a mining contract which the plaintiff alleged was unconscionable due to a seven-day termination clause invoked by Itmann nine months into
a five year contract agreement. V & R also, on the strength of an alleged oral
modification of the agreement, borrowed $250,000 for the purchase of new equipment and produced at an elevated level for four months, but upon termination,
Itmann refused to purchase the on-site equipment and did not provide V & R
with another site to mine, so that V & R discontinued operations.
The issues addressed by the court were: (1) Whether the termination clause
in this contract was so one-sided as to lead to absurd results, and therefore unconscionable; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient on the part of the party
seeking to establish an oral modification so as to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that the minds of the parties definitely met on the alteration.
In affirming the circuit court's ruling, the court found that all the testimony
indicated that mutual termination on short notice is a common, or even standard,
provision in a contract mining agreement, and such clauses were included in all
-Itmann's contracts with its contract miners, being of potential benefit to both
sides. Such common business usage, benefit to parties similarly situated, and potential benefit meant the provision was not unconscionable As to V & R's claim
of "procedural unconscionability" or overall unconscionability, two of V & R's
officials read the contract prior to execution and there was no compelling evidence
that any unfair provision was forced upon them. Further, a determination as to
unconscionability must be made as of the date of execution, not after termination.
All of appellant's evidence of conversations relative to oral modifications, guaranteed purchases of increased production, etc. showed no reference that the
written contract was even mentioned. The single piece of documentation offered
made it clear that Itmann's ability to purchase increased tonnage was contingent
on the continuation of good market conditions. Any reliance on statements guaranteeing a perpetual market was simply unreasonable on V & R's part. Even were
such oral modifications proven, they would not affect the termination clause.
Gerald Bobango
See also,
CIVIL PROCEDURE:

Danco, Inc. v. Donahue, 341 S.E.2d 676 (W. Va. 1985).
INSURANCE:

Warden v. Bank of Mingo, 341 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1985).
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